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Religious Arguments by Citizens
to Influence Public Policy:
The Lessons of the
Establishment Clause
by Gary J. Simson*
I am delighted to be a part of this richly deserved celebration of Jack
Sammons's scholarship. As a scholar, Jack is truly in a class of his own.
He offers a rare combination of qualities. For now, I will mention three
of the qualities that together make him so special, but they by no means
exhaust the list.
First of all, over a career as a legal scholar going back to his appointment to the Mercer law faculty in the late 1970s and continuing
unabated today more than a year into his retirement from teaching, Jack
has been wonderfully productive. He publishes often and on a remarkably wide array of subjects. Jack is very much not one of those scholars
who manage to be productive by plowing the same field time and again.
He has almost boundless intellectual curiosity, and he genuinely loves
to engage in the scholarly give-and-take that comes with sharing his
ideas with others at conferences and in print.
Second, Jack demonstrates in his scholarship a conversance with
philosophy that is all the more impressive because it is largely selftaught. It is not at all uncommon to be reading one of Jack's articles and
come across a thoughtful discussion in the text or footnotes of Wittgenstein or Heidegger or some other philosophical heavyweight whose
* Senior Vice Provost for Scholarship and Macon Chair in Law, Mercer University;
Professor Emeritus of Law, Cornell University. Yale College (B., 1971); Yale Law School
(J.D., 1974). This Article is a much-expanded version of my presentation at the Mercer
Law Review Symposium on October 3, 2014 honoring Jack Sammons. I am grateful to
various of those in attendance for their helpful questions and suggestions. Special thanks
go to Professor Rosalind Simson for her detailed comments on a recent draft and for her
enthusiasm and encouragement about this project from the start.
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writings are sufficiently inaccessible to nonphilosophers to send the
great majority of legal scholars running for cover. To borrow one of
Jack's favorite words, the "mystery"1' of Wittgenstein or Heidegger is for
him not the least bit off-putting, but rather part of the attraction.
Third and lastly, although Jack writes in prose, his work has a
freedom, imagination, and suggestiveness to it that make it something
more akin to poetry. Jack can dissect a court opinion or explain legal
doctrine with the best of them. Ultimately, however-and this may well
be the one quality that most sets him apart from other legal scholars-he
is a poet at heart.2
Last spring, as I began to think about possible topics for my contribution to this Symposium, I decided to broach the subject with Jack. His
and my scholarly interests coincide most closely in the area of law and
religion, and he suggested that I take a look at his article, A Rhetorician's View of Religious Speech in Civic Argument? In the article Jack
examines the proper role of religious convictions in "civic argument" in
a democracy. By "civic argument," he means "political argument broadly
construed."4 Underlining that "a democracy is a rhetorical community,"
he reasons from the premise that "all voices in a democracy should be
heard, each equal to the other, in all matters of social importance to the
practical extent that they can be, given our need to make decisions and
to make them timely."5 In arguing for a broad role for religious
convictions in civic argument, he takes issue with philosophers in the

1. See, e.g., Jack L. Sammons, A Rhetorician's View of Religious Speech in Civic
Argument, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 367, 368, 375, 386 (2009).
2. While on the subject of poets, I would be remiss not to mention the important bond
that exists between Jack and me in our shared admiration of the artist often dubbed the
"poet laureate of rock and roll." See, e.g., Bob Dylan Biography, ROCK AND ROLL HALL OF
FAME AND MUSEUM, http://rockhall.com/inductees/bob-dylan/bio/(last visited Jan. 12,2015)
("Bob Dylan is the uncontested poet laureate of the rock and roll era...."); Martin Jacobi,
Bob Dylan and Collaboration,in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO BOB DYLAN 69, 75 (Kevin
J.H. Dettmar ed., 2009) (suggesting that the poet Allen Ginsberg "provided Dylan with
cover to move from folk singer to 'the poet laureate of rock & roll.' "). For confirmation of
Jack's and my shared admiration of Dylan, compare Jack L. Sammons, The Georgia Crawl,
53 MERCER L. REv. 985, 991 (2002) (quoting the opening lines of Dylan's masterful song,
"Blind Willie McTell," a history of the South in five kaleidoscopic verses that is named for
the legendary Georgia bluesman), with Gary J. Simson & Stephen P. Garvey, Knockin' on
Heaven'sDoor:Rethinking the Role ofReligion in Death Penalty Cases,86 CORNELL L. REV.
1090, 1090 n.tt (2001) ("Special thanks to Bob Dylan for the timeless song named in the
first part of our title.").
3. Sammons, supra note 1.
4. Id. at 367 n.1.
5. Id. at 368.
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"liberal political tradition," who customarily place restraints on religious
speech that, in his view, "cannot be justified in a democracy.'6
As my contribution to the Symposium, I too would like to examine the
extent to which citizens in a democracy may properly rely on religious
arguments in seeking to influence the formulation of public policy. I will
do so, however, from a perspective that seems to be rather distinctive
among commentators on the subject-a perspective that attaches special
significance to the limitations that the Establishment Clause places on
our national commitment to democratic government.7 In my view, the

6. Id. at 368-69. Scholars have taken a wide range of positions on the appropriate role
of religious arguments in citizens' efforts to influence public policy. Some regard religious
arguments as best excluded from the public sphere. In his article, Jack addresses one
proponent of this view, Robert Audi, in considerable detail. See id. at 371 n. 10, 376-79 &
n.23, 384-85. Other proponents include Bruce Ackerman and John Rawls. See BRUCE A.
ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); John Rawls, Justice as Fairness:
Political not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223 (1985). (In light of the length (378
pages) of Professor Ackerman's book, I should note that his attitude toward religious
arguments in the public sphere is principally conveyed in the book by implication, rather
than by express discussion of religious argument. In particular, religious argument rather
obviously does not comport with the "principle of Rationality" and the "ideal of Neutral
discourse" that he sees as central to the legitimate exercise of power. See ACKERMAN,
supra, at 6, 14. In the few places in the book in which Professor Ackerman does deal
explicitly with religious argument, his strong opposition to religious argument in the public
sphere is apparent. See, e.g., id. at 110-11, 352-53.). Among those scholars advocating the
very different view that religious arguments are an important part of public debate are
Richard Neuhaus and Michael Perry. See, e.g., RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC
SQUARE (1984); MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND
MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991). Kent Greenawalt is representative of those taking
more of a nuanced, middle position on the subject. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS
CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988). For a thoughtful overview of the competing
positions, see Ruti Teitel, A Critique of Religion as Politics in the Public Sphere, 78
CORNELL L. REV. 747 (1993).
7. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion...."). To the extent that other commentators on the subject discuss the Establishment Clause at all, they typically do so largely by way of general background and without
any suggestion that the Clause's importance extends beyond lawmakers and the
constitutional imperative that it imposes on them. See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at
244-57 (the final chapter of Professor Greenawalt's book on the subject-a chapter that, in
his words, "considers the problem of constitutional law I have put to the side for the main
part of the analysis: what reliance on religious convictions in lawmaking amounts to an
impermissible establishment of religion?"). In a sense, Professor Perry's perspective comes
closest to mine, because he recognizes that it would be highly problematic for there to be
"tension" between the Establishment Clause and a particular conception of the propriety
of citizens' religious arguments in the public sphere. PERRY, supra note 6, at 112. However,
as is clear from Professor Perry's one brief discussion of the Establishment Clause in his
book, see id. at 112-17, his and my understandings of the Establishment Clause are so far
apart that our perspectives on the relevance of the Establishment Clause to the propriety
of citizens' religious arguments in the public sphere ultimately cannot help but be very
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proper scope of citizens' reliance on religious arguments in this sphere
is intimately related to the importance that lawmakers, in a system of
government limited by the Establishment Clause, may properly assign
to religious convictions in drafting and voting on laws.
Writing in 1971 for an 8-1 majority of the U.S. Supreme Court, Chief
Justice Warren Burger in Lemon v. Kurtzman characterized government
"sponsorship" of religion as one of the "three main evils against which
the Establishment Clause was intended to afford protection."' In
addition, he underlined that, in interpreting the Clause, it is essential
to "draw lines with reference to" those evils.9 Although the now-famous
three-prong "Lemon test" that the Chief Justice proceeded to unveil did
not explicitly "draw lines with reference to" sponsorship or the other two
evils that he named,' ° the Court plainly applied the test in Lemon and
later cases with special attention to those evils."
In Part I of this Article, I take as a starting point the Court's
characterization of sponsorship as a prime historic Establishment Clause
evil, and I sketch the implications of that characterization for citizens'
reliance on religious arguments when they seek to influence lawmaking.
To avoid possible misunderstanding, I underline at the outset that my
focus is citizens seeking to influence lawmaking, not citizens engaged in
lawmaking as occurs, for example, when the citizenry are authorized to
decide a matter by referendum. When citizens decide a matter by

different. The essence of his understanding of the Clause is captured by the following,
which, as will become increasingly apparent, contrasts sharply with the understanding that

informs this Article:
There is no accepted interpretation of the establishment clause, nor, more
important, is there any plausible interpretation of the clause (whether accepted
or not), according to which citizens or their political representatives act in a
constitutionally problematic way if they make political choices partly or even

wholly on the basis of religious convictions about the good or fitting way for
human beings to live their lives, or, much less, if they publicly deliberate about
or publicly justify political choices on that basis.
Id. at 113.
8.

403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). The two other "evils" that the Chief Justice named were

government "financial support" of religion and "active involvement of the sovereign in
religious activity." Id.
9. Id.
10. See id. at 612-13 ("First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion.'" (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
11. See Gary J. Simson, The Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court: Rethinking
the Court'sApproach, 72 CoRNELL L. REV. 905 (1987) (discussing the Court's case law in

terms of those evils, and proposing, among other things, that the Court revise the first two
prongs of the Lemon test to refer specifically to those evils).
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referendum, they count, for constitutional purposes, as lawmakers no
less than if they were members of the state legislature. That has long
been the Supreme Court's understanding, and rightly so.12 The
Establishment Clause governs, and constrains, citizens' behavior when
they exercise lawmaking authority by referendum or otherwise no
differently than it governs, and constrains, the behavior of the citizenry's
elected representatives when those representatives engage in lawmaking.
For purposes of Part I, I make two important assumptions. First, I
assume the validity of the Court's characterization of government
sponsorship of religion as one of the principal evils at which the
Establishment Clause was aimed. Second, I assume that, in keeping
with the invalidity under the Clause of a purpose of promoting the evil
of government sponsorship of religion, lawmakers should not take
religious reasons into account when deciding whether or not to adopt
particular legislation. Because both assumptions are open to debate, I
devote Part II to defending the first assumption and Part III to
defending the second. I conclude with some final words on the subject-our honoree-on which I began.

I.

FROM CONSTITUTIONAL TO CiviC CONSTRAINTS

I begin with a proposition that, as noted above, is not uncontroversial
and will be defended at length in Parts II and III: A lawmaker may not,
consistently with the Establishment Clause, give positive weight to a
purpose of sponsoring religion in deciding what laws to draft and how to
vote on proposed laws. I use "lawmaker" and "laws" broadly. By
"lawmaker," I mean any governmental actor-federal, state, or local-vested with authority to make decisions on the government's behalf
that, directly or indirectly, affect one or more members of the public. By
"laws," I mean decisions of the sort just described.13 In keeping with the
Supreme Court's use of "sponsorship" or "endorsement"-terms that it
appears to use interchangeably-I use "a purpose of sponsoring religion"

12. See, e.g., Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014);
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
13.

Although the Establishment Clause expressly addresses only lawmaking by

Congress, it is understood to apply to the full range of federal governmental lawmaking.
See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (rejecting an Establishment Clause
challenge to an Act of Congress on its face, but remanding for a determination as to
whether the Secretary of Health and Human Services made any grants under the Act that
violate the Establishment Clause as applied). In addition, by virtue of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Establishment Clause has been held applicable
to all forms of state and local governmental lawmaking. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
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to mean a purpose of communicating to a reasonable observer a
preference on the part of the government either that he or she adhere to
a particular religion or religious belief or that he or she adhere to some
religion (as opposed to adhering to no religion at all). 4
Ultimately, if lawmakers are indeed constrained by the Establishment
Clause in the way that I posit above, the Clause's command to them is,
in essence, quite simple: Don't let religious convictions-whether yours or
your constituents-enter into your decisions. I submit that if it is wrong
for lawmakers to rely on religious reasons in lawmaking, that has
important implications for citizens seeking to persuade lawmakers how
to exercise their lawmaking authority. In particular, it follows that it
must also be wrong for citizens to seek to persuade lawmakers by
religious reasons-the very type of reasons that lawmakers are constitutionally prohibited from taking into account. And if that is so, then it
also follows that citizens act wrongly whether they address religious
arguments directly to lawmakers or whether they address religious
arguments to other constituents in the hope that the others will be
persuaded by those arguments and bring pressure to bear on the
lawmakers to honor those arguments by voting in accordance with them.
It may be objected that this line of reasoning conflates two very
different kinds of obligations. On the one hand, as governmental actors,
lawmakers have constitutional obligations to abide by the commands of
the Establishment Clause. On the other hand, as nongovernmental
actors, private citizens are outside the scope of the Clause; whatever
they do or don't do has no bearing on their fulfillment of constitutional
obligations, because they have none.
The fact, however, that private citizens do not formally have constitutional obligations is no justification for defining their civic obligations

14. Thanks to Justice O'Connor-the principal author in the 1980s of the "endorsement
test"-the Court in the past 25-30 years primarily seems to speak in terms of "endorsement," rather than "sponsorship." As illustrated by Chief Justice Burger's opinion in
Lemon, see supra text accompanying note 8, the Court previously seemed to prefer
speaking in terms of "sponsorship." The Court's references to a "reasonable" or "objective"

observer appear to begin with its first applications and restatements of the endorsement
test that Justice O'Connor had proposed as "a clarification of our Establishment Clause
doctrine." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Lynch,

id. at 687-94, and Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 67-84 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in the judgment), Justice O'Connor spelled out in some detail the contours of an
endorsement test and offered a fairly detailed explanation of its theoretical underpinnings.
I have argued elsewhere that, in deciding whether or not particular governmental action
constitutes an endorsement of religion, a focus on nonadherents of the allegedly sponsored
religion or religious belief is preferable to the focus in the Court's endorsement test on the
"reasonable" or "objective" observer. See Simson, supra note 11, at 915-16. For present
purposes, however, there is no need to press the point.
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without regard to the obligations that the Constitution places on those
exercising authority in our system of government. Rather, one would
suppose that foremost among citizens' civic obligations are obligations to
act in ways that harmonize with the obligations that the Constitution
places on governmental actors. By all indications, the framers of the
Constitution structured the federal system as they did, including placing
certain constraints on the exercise of federal and state power, in an
effort to serve the greater good. Part of citizens' obligation to help serve
the greater good is to make the system work well by facilitating
governmental actors' efforts to abide by constitutional constraints. For
citizens to impede governmental actors' efforts to abide by Establishment
Clause constraints by pressing upon them, directly or indirectly,
religious arguments that they are constitutionally barred from adopting
would be the height of civic irresponsibility.
I underline that, in saying that citizens who try to influence lawmakers directly or indirectly by religious arguments are acting in a civically
irresponsible way, I am not saying that the government can penalize
citizens for engaging in such behavior. In interpreting the First
Amendment's Free Speech Clause," the Supreme Court long ago
settled that, absent exceptionally strong justification in terms of the
likelihood, immediacy, and seriousness of the harm threatened by
speech, the government cannot punish speech based on its content if
such speech has bearing on our political and lawmaking processes.'"
The government could not arguably make the showing of justification
needed to sustain legislation punishing religious speech because of its
potential to affect lawmakers' decisions. According to the Court, the Free
Speech Clause requires government to tolerate speech in the public
arena that many, if not almost all, citizens may regard as utterly
despicable. 7 The notion that government could justify being less
tolerant of arguments grounded in sincere religious belief is simply
unthinkable.
The First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause independently ensures
that, however civically irresponsible it may be for citizens to try to sway
lawmakers, directly or indirectly, with religious arguments, the
government cannot punish citizens for doing so. In 1990, the Supreme

15. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of

speech....").
16. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Schenck v. United States, 249

U.S. 47 (1919).
17. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Brandenburg,395 U.S. 444; Am.
Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affd mem., 475 U.S. 1001
(1986).
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8
Court in Employment Division v. Smith"
by a 5-4 margin dramatically
reduced the range of laws that may be challenged under the Free
Exercise Clause. At least as far back as the early 1960s, the Court
regularly had allowed free exercise claimants to challenge the validity
of applying a law to them that, though making no mention of religion on
its face, substantially burdens their ability to practice their religion.'"
Without even acknowledging the magnitude of the change in free
exercise law that it was effecting, the Court in Smith essentially
abolished such as-applied attacks, with the exception of a few small
categories that the Court seemingly recognized simply out of a desire to
preserve certain precedents that one or more Justices in the tenuous
Smith majority insisted not be disturbed.2 °
A law penalizing citizens for making religious arguments to influence
lawmakers strikes so close to the core of the Free Exercise Clause that,
even after Smith's large-scale retrenchment of the protection offered by
the Clause, such a law could not survive free exercise review. As the
Court suggested in Smith 2 ' and invoked as its ground for decision
several years later in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
22
Hialeah,
the Clause protects against laws that "target" religion for
disadvantage. In the Hialeah case, the Court unanimously struck down
ordinances enacted by the city council of Hialeah, Florida that, on their
face, made no mention of religion but that, in the Court's view, were
thinly veiled attempts to suppress the animal sacrifice practices
fundamental to the Santeria religion. Although a law forbidding
religious arguments in the public domain would disadvantage all
religions, rather than simply one as in the Hialeah case, either form of
disadvantage qualifies as targeting for purposes of the Clause. Moreover,
if the Clause prevents government from targeting a religious practice as
repulsive to most people as animal sacrifice, its protection of religious
argumentation in the public arena cannot be in doubt.
To return, however, to my main point, I emphasize that there is
nothing the least bit inconsistent with, on the one hand, recognizing that
the First Amendment's Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses bar the
government from punishing people for certain behavior and, on the other
hand, maintaining that, as good citizens, people should not be engaging

18. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
19. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
20. See Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Michael
W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109

(1990).
21. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-78.
22. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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in such behavior. If this is not obvious when one thinks in isolation
about behavior consisting of religious arguments to achieve political
ends, then it should become obvious when one also thinks about behavior
such as speech advocating the subordination of racial and religious
minorities or religious exercise taking the form of the ritualistic killing
of roosters and goats. The fact therefore that the Supreme Court would
not hesitate to hold that religious arguments to achieve political ends
are broadly protected from government interference by the Free Speech
and Free Exercise Clauses in no way suggests that citizens' making such
arguments is a good thing. Indeed, it is entirely compatible with my
thesis that, in light of the Establishment Clause's nonsponsorship
constraint on lawmakers, citizens' making such arguments is an
affirmatively bad thing.
To what extent, however, if at all, does citizens' civic responsibility not
to seek to influence lawmakers by religious arguments logically extend
beyond refraining from explicit advocacy of religious arguments in the
public arena? Consider the following scenario, which seems to arise with
some frequency: For a variety of reasons, some religious and some not,
a citizen favors the adoption of a particular law. She is aware that some
others who favor adoption do so based on one or more nonreligious
reasons that they find dispositive. She herself, however, does not find
persuasive the nonreligious reasons standing alone. Does her civic
responsibility not to seek to influence lawmakers by religious arguments
allow her to argue for adopting the law as long as she limits herself to
making nonreligious arguments?
In my view, the answer has to be "no" for two reasons-one related to
the Establishment Clause and the other more generic. First, although
the citizen is not directly pressing lawmakers or other citizens to buy
into religious arguments, she is pressing them to buy into an outcome-adoption of the particular law-that, but for those religious
arguments, she regards as unwarranted and incorrect. By seeking,
directly or indirectly, to influence lawmakers to adopt a law that, in her
view, should not be adopted but for religious reasons, she is attempting
to get lawmakers to rely, wittingly or unwittingly, on those religious
reasons, contrary to their obligations under the Establishment Clause.
That, I maintain, qualifies as civically irresponsible behavior.
Second, I suggest that, in and of itself, the citizen's intentional lack of
candor and transparency in public argument violates basic norms of civic
responsibility. Candor and transparency in public argument are key
ingredients of a political process that proceeds, as ours does at least in
the ideal, on a basic trust in the free and open exchange of ideas. As
Justice Holmes memorably put it:
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[Wihen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes
safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution .... 23
Even assuming, for purposes of argument, that there are certain
circumstances that may make it civically responsible for a citizen to
argue publicly in a manner deliberately lacking in candor and transparency, there is, at a minimum, a strong presumption in our constitutional
system that an intentional lack of candor and transparency in public
argument violates a citizen's civic responsibilities. Moreover, the fact
that particular arguments are religious in nature is not arguably a
circumstance of the sort that would categorically excuse deliberate lack
of candor and transparency in public argument and make such behavior
consistent with civic responsibility.
If, as I have contended, the citizen's civic responsibilities preclude her
from arguing in nonreligious terms for a law that she believes should not
be adopted but for religious reasons, does she have a civic responsibility
to speak out against adoption of the law? I very much doubt it.' The
notion that she may have a civic responsibility to argue for a political
result that she disfavors for religious reasons seems irreconcilable with
the respect for individual religious liberty commanded by the Free
Exercise Clause. It is one thing to argue that she has a civic responsibility essentially to recuse herself from public debate; it is quite another to
argue that as a good citizen she ought to be advocating for a result in
the political process to which she has strong religious objection.25
Consider another scenario in which a citizen favors the adoption of a
particular law for a variety of religious and nonreligious reasons. In this

23. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,630 (1919) (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
24. It would seem incumbent on anyone answering "yes" to this question to provide a
general framework for deciding when citizens have a civic responsibility to make their
views on any issue known. In light of my response to the question, I make no attempt to
address that topic.
25. At least in the abstract, it seems conceivable that a citizen's support for adopting
a particular law may depend on a religious reason of a sort that she would not feel that she
is compromising her religious beliefs by advocating against adoption of the law. If so, then
the conflict that I posit with free exercise values does not exist. I seriously question,
however, the workability of any conception of civic responsibility that requires individual
citizens to draw a distinction of this kind between religious reasons they may hold.
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instance, however, the citizen concludes after careful consideration that,
even if he did not take into account the religious reasons, he would favor
adoption of the law. Does his civic responsibility not to make religious
arguments to influence lawmakers allow him to argue publicly for
adoption as long as he confines his arguments to nonreligious ones?
Here, as may be obvious from comments I have already made, my
answer is definitely "yes." Because his support of the law does not
depend on religious reasons, there is no sense in which he is urging
lawmakers to reach a result that he believes is unwarranted absent
religious reasons. In addition, because he finds the nonreligious reasons
dispositive, there is no sense in which he is being less than candid and
transparent in making only nonreligious arguments.
Finally, I underline that, although there has long been some disagreement as to what counts as "religion" for purposes of the First Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses,2" it is quite reasonable to expect citizens to work with a conception of civic responsibility
that requires them to distinguish between religious and nonreligious
arguments. In deciding what is or is not a "religious" argument for
purposes of understanding what kinds of arguments she may publicly
make in keeping with her civic responsibilities, a citizen is engaged in
an enterprise very different from the one in which a judge is engaged
when trying to decide what is or is not "religious" within the meaning of
the First Amendment. The need to draw refined distinctions is not as
great as it is in the constitutional context, because the stakes are not as
high. The difference is the difference between, on the one hand, "should"
and "should not" and, on the other hand, "may" and "may not."
Furthermore, precisely because it is an ordinary citizen, rather than a
decisionmaker with the legal expertise of a judge, who is seeking to
distinguish religious from nonreligious arguments for purposes of

26. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 247-48 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting
in part) ("[Tihe Court [today] retreats when in reference to Henry Thoreau it says his
'choice was philosophical and personal rather than religious, and such belief does not rise
to the demands of the Religion Clauses.'"); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 & n. 11
(1961) (making clear that the protection of the Religion Clauses is not limited to belief
systems that include "a belief in the existence of God," and tacitly repudiating the contrary
understanding in Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890)); Int'l Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 440-41 (2d Cir. 1981) (defining "religion" in
the First Amendment in terms of "ultimate concern"); JESSE H. CHOPER, SECURING

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 74-80 (1995) (advocating a definition in terms of "extratemporal
consequences"); Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in ConstitutionalLaw, 72 CALIF.
L. REV. 753 (1984) (proposing that difficult questions of whether a particular belief system
qualifies as "religion" should be decided based on the closeness of the "analogy" between
the belief system in question and ones that are "indisputably" religious).
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deciding civic responsibility, there would be a greater premium on
ensuring that the means for distinguishing religious from nonreligious
arguments lends itself to ease of application. I suggest that citizens very
appropriately could use the following means for distinction, based on its
simplicity and ease of application and notwithstanding its approximate
and inexact nature: Ask yourself if the argument that you are thinking
of making is an argument that you would make if you knew your
audience included only individuals who do not adhere to any religion and
individuals who adhere to a religion that differs substantially from your
own.
II.

THE FAR-FROM-"ANTIQUATED" ENDORSEMENT TEST

For all practical purposes, Supreme Court interpretation of the
Establishment Clause did not get seriously under way until 1947. That
was the year in which the Court first held that the Clause applies not
only to federal governmental action but also, by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, to state and local governmental action
as well.
Thanks to this "incorporation" of Establishment Clause
principles that, like all principles express or implicit in the first ten
amendments, initially applied only to the federal government, 8
controversial religion-related issues arising out of state and local laws-in
particular, issues of religion in public schools and public aid to parochial
schools-suddenly became matters of Establishment Clause interpretation. Simultaneously, the Justices went from addressing the meaning
of the Clause only very rarely and never very deeply to addressing it
quite frequently and in considerable depth and detail.
The importance that lawmakers, in keeping with the Establishment
Clause, may give religious convictions very much depends on the answer
to a question that has been a source of debate on the Supreme Court for
at least the past fifty years: Does the Establishment Clause prohibit
government sponsorship of a particular religion or religious belief
without more, or does the Clause only prohibit government sponsorship
when the sponsorship comes in the form of government action that
coerces nonadherents of the sponsored religion or religious belief to act
in conformity with that religion or religious belief? If government
sponsorship standing alone violates the Clause, lawmakers run the risk
of overstepping constitutional bounds any time they allow their (or their
constituents') religious convictions to play a significant part in their
decision whether or not to adopt a particular law. If, however, govern-

27. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
28. Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
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ment sponsorship violates the Clause only when it is communicated by
coercive measures, lawmakers are free to rely on their (or their
constituents') religious convictions as much as they like as long as they
refrain from coercing nonadherents to act consistently with the
convictions.
Dissenting in June 2014 from a denial of certiorari,2 9 Justice Scalia
maintained that in a case decided the month before-Town of Greece v.
Galloway3°-the Supreme Court had definitively answered the above
question in favor of the second option: sponsorship is a problem only if
it takes the form of coercive government action. Justice Scalia acknowledged that the Court some time ago had adopted an "endorsement test"
that tacitly answered the above question in favor of the first option.31
He flatly stated, however, that the Court's decision in Galloway
"abandoned the antiquated 'endorsement test."'3 2
Although Justice Scalia was obviously using "antiquated" to be critical
of the endorsement test, it is difficult to say exactly what he meant by
it. His choice of words was imprecise to say the least. According to one
widely used dictionary, "antiquated" means "very old and no longer
useful, popular, or accepted; very old-fashioned or obsolete," and good
synonyms include "outdated" and "moribund."33 To start with, any
notion of the endorsement test as "very old" is peculiar at best.
Particularly compared to various constitutional tests that the Supreme
Court has created in other areas and continues to apply-for example, the
balancing test in dormant Commerce Clause cases, which dates back at
least to the 1940s,34 or, even better, the fundamental interest test in
Privileges and Immunities Clause cases, which originated in an opinion
by a Supreme Court Justice riding circuit in 1823 35-the endorsement
test, which came into being in the mid-1980s,36 seems positively
youthful.
Thinking about the test as "no longer useful" or "outdated" has other
problems. In particular, it does not seem to capture Justice Scalia's
meaning well. After all, to call something "no longer useful" or "outdated" implies that at least at some point in time, it had some utility.

29. Elmbrook Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 134 S. Ct. 2283, 2283-86 (2014) (Scalia, J., joined by
Thomas, J., dissenting).
30. 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
31. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 134 S. Ct. at 2283-84.
32. Id. at 2284.
33. MERRIAM-WEBSTER, www.merriam-webster.condictionary/antiquated (last visited
Jan. 13, 2015).
34. See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767, 783-84 (1945).
35. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
36. See infra notes 47 & 48 and accompanying text.
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However, by all indications, Justice Scalia would be unwilling to concede
that the test ever worked well. 7 Perhaps equating Justice Scalia's use
of "antiquated" with "moribund" is most meaningful. Over the years
Justice Scalia has spared the endorsement test the type of satire that he
inflicted on another Establishment Clause test-the Lemon test38-to
express his frustration with his colleagues for, as he saw it, draining a
deeply flawed test of all vitality but refusing ever to pronounce it
dead.39 Particularly because Justice Scalia in his recent dissent made
clear that he regards the endorsement test as a subset of the Lemon
test,4 ° it does not seem a stretch to assume that he also saw the
endorsement test prior to Galloway in a similar light.
After demonstrating below in Section A that the Supreme Court over
the years generally has been more supportive of the endorsement test
and the principle underlying it than Justice Scalia seems to suggest, I
address and refute in Section B his unambiguous claim that the Court
in Galloway abandoned the test. I then turn in Section C to text,
history, and other interpretive tools to underline that, contrary to Justice
Scalia's view and precedent aside, the endorsement test reflects an
eminently defensible interpretation of the Clause-one that very
reasonably may be taken as authoritative in thinking about the
importance that legislators may give religious convictions in lawmaking
and, by extension, the importance that ordinary citizens may give
religious convictions in public debate.
A.

The Nonendorsement Principle in the Supreme Court Pre-Galloway
In its watershed 1947 incorporation case, the Supreme Court,
seemingly casting to the winds any concerns about avoiding dictum,
stated that the Establishment Clause "means at least this ' "l and

37. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640-45 (1992) (Scalia, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Thomas, JJ., dissenting); Allegheny Cnty. v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573, 668-77 (1989) (Scalia, J., joining opinion of Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
38. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). The test is quoted supra note

10.
39. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398-99 (1993)
(Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Like some ghoul in a late-

night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being
repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once
again.... The secret of the Lemon test's survival, I think, is that it is so easy to kill. It is
there to scare us (and our audience) when we wish it to do so, but we can command it to
return to the tomb at will.")
40. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 134 S. Ct. at 2284 & n.*.
41. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
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proceeded to recite a half-dozen or so fairly broad prohibitions, only one
of which was arguably implicated by the case at hand.4 2 Among those
prohibitions named but not implicated was one pertaining to sponsorship: "Neither a state nor the Federal Government ... can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another."4 3
The centrality of a sponsorship prohibition to the Court's understanding of the Establishment Clause was settled beyond doubt, however, in
1963, if not earlier. In 1963, the Court handed down its landmark
decision in Abington School District v. Schempp," invalidating official
Bible-reading and prayer exercises at the start of the public school day.
According to the Court in Schempp, the Establishment Clause requires
the government to be neutral between religions and between religion and
nonreligion, 5 and government action that fails to meet this mandate of
neutrality violates the Clause without regard to whether the action can
be shown to have a "coercive effect."46

42. Id. at 15-16. The prohibition that the Court treated as arguably implicated, but
ultimately not controlling, was a prohibition on using tax-raised funds to "support any
religious activities or institutions." Id. at 16.
43. Id. at 15.
44. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
45. Id. at 218-22.
46. Id. at 222-23. The Court in Schempp, id. at 221, quoted language from Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1962), contrasting the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses in terms of the "showing of direct governmental compulsion" needed to prove a
violation of the latter, but not the former, clause. Particularly in light of that language,
it would not be unreasonable to treat Engel, rather than Schempp, as the case that settled
the importance of a sponsorship prohibition to the Court's Establishment Clause approach.
I hesitate to do so, however, because of the Court's emphasis in Engel on the separate
Establishment Clause "evil" presented by the state-created prayers at issue in the case-the
"evil" that the Court later labeled "active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity"
and included in its short list of "three main evils against which the Establishment Clause
was intended to afford protection." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
As part of their "Statement on Moral and Spiritual Training in the Schools," the New
York Board of Regents had composed a prayer for New York schoolchildren to recite at the
start of each school day. In invalidating New York's "using its public school system to
encourage recitation of the Regents' prayer," Engel, 370 U.S. at 424, the Court in Engel
emphasized the state-created nature of the prayer. At the start of its analysis, the Court
explained:
The petitioners contend among other things that the state laws requiring or
permitting use of the Regents' prayer must be struck down as a violation of the
Establishment Clause because that prayer was composed by governmental officials
as a part of a governmental program to further religious beliefs. For this reason,
petitioners argue, the State's use of the Regents' prayer in its public school system
breaches the constitutional wall of separation between Church and State. We
agree with that contention since we think that the constitutional prohibition
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Subsequently, the Court's understanding of the Clause as a prohibition
on state sponsorship of religion culminated in its adoption of an
endorsement test.47 In essence, under that test, a law fails Establishment Clause review if the court determines that either (a) the law is
based virtually entirely on a purpose of endorsing a particular religion
or religious belief (or religion over nonreligion) or (b) a reasonable
observer is likely to perceive the law as sending a message of government endorsement of a particular religion or religious belief (or of
religion over nonreligion).4"
Contemporaneous with the above developments in the case law,
however, a minority view was emerging that rejected the Supreme Court
majority's interpretation of the Establishment Clause as a ban on
government sponsorship of religion. In Schempp, one member of the
Court-Justice Stewart-maintained in dissent that the constitutionality
of the prayer practices under review "turns on the question of coercion."49 According to Justice Stewart, the evidence at hand was
insufficient to determine whether schoolchildren who did not wish to
participate in the practices were feeling coerced to do so, and a remand
to the trial court "for the taking of additional evidence" ° was therefore
essential.

against laws respecting an establishment of religion must at least mean that in
this country it is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers
for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious program
carried on by government.
Id. at 425. The Court then proceeded to discuss the early colonists' concern with
'governmentally composed prayers," such as those comprising the Book of Common Prayer
that was "created under governmental direction" and approved by Parliament in 16th
century England. Id. at 425-26.
47. See Allegheny Cnty. v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592-94, 599-600 (1989); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 & n.42 (1985).
48. See Gary J. Simson, EndangeringReligious Liberty, 84 CALIF. L. REv. 441, 469-71
(1996); supra note 14.
49. 374 U.S. at 316 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 308. According to Justice Stewart, if, as was not the case in Schempp, the
practices were being administered without any opportunity for a child to be excused upon
a parent's request, the practices "would obviously be unconstitutionally coercive." Id. at
318. If, however, the school provided for excusal, coercion was not necessarily a nonissue
in Stewart's view. For example, "ifthe exercises were held during the school day, and no
equally desirable alternative were provided by the school authorities, the likelihood that
children might be under at least some psychological compulsion to participate would be
great." Id. But even in instances, like the latter, where Stewart perceived a "great"
likelihood of some psychological compulsion, he cautioned against concluding, without
more, that there was coercion. "We would err," he maintained, "ifwe assumed such
coercion in the absence of any evidence." Id.
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By the late 1980s, the number of Justices sitting on the Court who
subscribed to the minority view espoused in Schempp had grown from
one to four. In an opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
1
White and Scalia, Justice Kennedy in Allegheny County v. ACLP
censured the endorsement test applied by the majority as "flawed in its
fundamentals and unworkable in practice." 2 He urged that the Court
instead apply a test focusing on coercion and affirm the constitutionality
of the two holiday displays on government-owned property under review
in the case.53 Like Justice Stewart in Schempp, Justice Kennedy did
not insist that the coercion needed to prove an Establishment Clause
violation be "direct coercion in the classic sense of an establishment of
religion that the Framers knew."54 According to Justice Kennedy, the
government violates the Clause any time it "coerce[s] anyone to support
or participate in any religion or its exercise," but it also oversteps the
bounds of the Clause when it applies "some measure of more or less
subtle coercion" taking the form, for example, of "governmental
exhortation to religiosity that amounts in fact to proselytizing. ""
Three years after handing down Allegheny County, the Court seemed
poised in Lee v. Weisman 56 to disavow both the endorsement test and
the Court's longtime understanding that the Establishment Clause is
best interpreted as barring government sponsorship of religion. Gone
were two of the five Justices who in Allegheny County had taken the
view that endorsement, rather than coercion, was the applicable test.

51. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
52. Id. at 669 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
53. Both displays were located in downtown Pittsburgh, Pa. One was a Nativity scene
that the county permitted a Catholic group to display each year during the Christmas
season in the County Courthouse. The other was a very large (18-foot-high) Hanukah
menorah that the city and county permitted a Jewish group to display during the same
time at the entrance to the City-County Building alongside an even larger (45-foot-high)
Christmas tree, whose constitutionality was not challenged. All five of the Justices who
agreed that the endorsement test was the appropriate test to apply concluded that the
Nativity scene, which stood alone in the main part of the County Courthouse, violated the
endorsement test. Thus, although Justice Kennedy and the three Justices who joined his
opinion would have upheld that display under a coercion test, the display was disallowed
by a 5-4 vote. The five Justices who applied the endorsement test were divided, however,
as to whether the menorah display constituted government endorsement of religion. Three
maintained that it constituted an endorsement, and two maintained that it did not. Those
two votes for constitutionality, combined with the Kennedy group's four votes for
constitutionality based on their application of a coercion test, produced a 6-3 vote for
upholding the menorah display.
54. Allegheny Cnty., 492 U.S. at 661 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
55. Id. at 659-60.
56. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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In their place were two Justices nominated by a Republican president
and widely expected to vote in ways that generally would please
conservatives, which, in the realm of church-state separation, meant
voting in ways friendly to government accommodation and support of
religion."7 Moreover, the case seemed to present the Court squarely
with the question of whether to retain the endorsement test, because the
constitutionality of the practice at issue in Lee-prayer offered by clergy
at public middle- and high-school graduations-appeared to turn on
whether the Court applied an endorsement, rather than coercion, test.
Surprisingly, however, the endorsement test emerged from Lee intact.
Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion of the Court for a 5-4 majority that
included one of the Court's two newest members and the three proponents in Allegheny County of an endorsement test who were still on the
Court. At the start, Justice Kennedy maintained that the case could be
decided without "revisit[ing] the difficult questions dividing us in recent
cases,"5 8 and lest anyone wonder whether one of those "difficult
questions" was the validity of the endorsement test, he cited Allegheny
County as one of the "recent cases" that he had in mind. 9 According to
Justice Kennedy, the Court need not grapple with such questions
because the case could be decided on the basis of a principle so
"fundamental" to the Establishment Clause that "li]t is beyond
dispute." 0 "[Alt a minimum," he wrote, "the Constitution guarantees
that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in
religion or its exercise.'6
Then, applying a conception of "coercion" almost certainly broader
than his opinion in Allegheny County would have led one to expect him
to apply, Justice Kennedy found unconstitutional coercion in the
graduation prayer practice under review. As he explained, "[Tlhe school
district's supervision and control of a high school graduation ceremony
places public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students
to stand as a group or, at least, maintain respectful silence during the
invocation and benediction." 2 Notwithstanding Justice Scalia's heated
charge in dissent that the majority opinion had "invent[ed] a boundless,

57.

See JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURO, SUPREME CONFLICT 142-43 (2007). David Souter,

President George H.W. Bush's nominee for the seat vacated by Justice Brennan, was
confirmed in September 1990, and Clarence Thomas, that president's nominee for the seat
vacated by Justice Marshall, was confirmed in October 1991.

58. 505 U.S. at 586.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id. at 587.
Id.
Id. at 593.
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and boundlessly manipulable, test of psychological coercion," 3 Justice
Kennedy insisted that, "though subtle and indirect," the pressure placed
on the students was "as real as any overt compulsion."" The four
Justices who joined Justice Kennedy's opinion made clear in concurring
opinions that they were not relinquishing their support for the endorsement test. As one wrote, "Although our precedents make clear that proof
of government coercion is not necessary to prove an Establishment
Clause violation, it is sufficient. "
With the retirement a year after Lee of Justice White, a staunch
supporter of replacing the endorsement test with a coercion test," and
the appointment to his seat of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who as a Justice
fairly quickly proved to be a strong proponent of the endorsement
test,6" the fate of the endorsement test no longer seemed to turn on
Justice Kennedy's vote. Even if Justice Kennedy were to vote to
abandon the endorsement test, the test would still enjoy the support of
five members of the Court.6 8 That held true for more than a decade,
during which time the only Justice who retired was replaced by one with
much the same views on the test.69

63. Id. at 632 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Thomas, JJ.,
dissenting).
64. Id. at 593 (majority opinion).
65. Id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., joined by Stevens and O'Connor, JJ., concurring). To
similar effect, see id. at 618 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens and O'Connor, JJ., concurring).
66. See, e.g., id. at 631-46 (White, J., joining opinion of Scalia, J., dissenting); Allegheny
Cnty. v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 668-77 (1989) (White, J., joining opinion of Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
67. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 817-18 (1995)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
68. Santa Fe Independent School Districtv. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000), does not suggest
otherwise, even though the Court relied substantially on Lee in invalidating the school
district policy under review. The policy provided that, each spring, the student body of the
district's public high school would determine by secret-ballot voting (a) whether to have an
invocation at the start of the school's home football games in the fall and (b) if so, which
member of the student body would be responsible for delivering the invocation at all the
home games. Unlike Lee, the vote for invalidation in the Santa Fe case was 6-3, rather
than 5-4. Also, unlike Lee, the senior Justice in the majority did not assign the majority
opinion to Justice Kennedy, rather than risk losing his vote if the majority opinion did not
meet with his approval. Lastly, unlike Lee, the majority opinion explained the invalidation
in terms not only of coercion, see, e.g., id. at 312 ("Even if we regard every high school
student's decision to attend a home football game as purely voluntary, we are nevertheless
persuaded that the delivery of a pregame prayer has the improper effect of coercing those
present to participate in an act of religious worship."), but of endorsement as well, see, e.g.,
id. at 316 ("Therefore, the simple enactment of this policy, with the purpose and perception
of school endorsement of student prayer, was a constitutional violation.").
69. Justice Blackmun, a proponent of the test (see, e.g., Allegheny Cnty., 492 U.S. at
592-94, 599-600), stepped down from the Court in 1994 and was succeeded by Justice
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In late June of 2005, with the Court nearing the end of the secondlongest stretch in its history with no changes in membership, the Court
handed down on the same day two 5-4 decisions on different kinds of
public displays of the Ten Commandments. 70 As in Allegheny County
in 1989, where the Court held unconstitutional one type of holiday
display under review and upheld the validity of another type,71 the
Court in the Ten Commandments cases came out differently on
constitutionality for the two kinds of displays. Also as in Allegheny
County, the different outcomes reflected differences in application of the
endorsement
test by the five Justices who, at the time, were supportive
72
of the test.

Within three months of the Ten Commandments cases, Chief Justice
Rehnquist had died, soon to be succeeded as Chief by John Roberts. Not
long after, Justice O'Connor, who had indicated her desire to retire prior
to the Chief Justice's death, left the Court in late January 2006, when
the Senate voted to confirm Samuel Alito for her seat. At the time of
Chief Justice Roberts's nomination, there was speculation that he was
likely to follow in his predecessor's footsteps as far as favoring abandon-

Breyer, whose support for the test became apparent not long after (see CapitolSquare, 515
U.S. at 786-92 (joining opinion of Souter, J., concurring)). After Justice Breyer joined the
Court in August 1994, there was no change in the composition of the Court until
September 2005, when Chief Justice Rehnquist died in office.
70. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677
(2005).
71. See supra note 53.
72. In McCreary the Court, in an opinion by Justice Souter joined by Justices Stevens,
O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that very similar Ten Commandments displays in
two Kentucky county courthouses each had a"predominantly religious purpose'-in essence,
a purpose of endorsing the religious beliefs expressed in the Ten Commandments.
McCreary, 545 U.S. at 867-74. In Van Orden, Justices Souter, Stevens, O'Connor, and
Ginsburg again found a violation of the endorsement test, this time in Texas's display of
a Ten Commandments monument on the State Capitol grounds along with 16 other
monuments and 21 historical markers. Justice Breyer, however, found no such violation.
Characterizing the case as "difficult, borderline" and "fact-intensive," Van Orden, 545 U.S.
at 700 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment), Justice Breyer concluded that Texas
"intended" the "nonreligious aspects of the tablets' message to predominate" and that "that
has been its effect." Id. at 701. In a separate opinion joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas, Chief Justice Rehnquist maintained that Texas's display did not violate the
Establishment Clause. He emphasized that although the Ten Commandments monument
"has religious significance," Moses "was a lawgiver as well as a religious leader," and "the
Ten Commandments have an undeniable historical meaning." Id. at 690 (plurality opinion
of Rehnquist, C.J.). Although Justice Breyer did not join the Chief Justice's opinion, his
vote was decisive in creating a majority for the judgment that the Chief Justice and the
three Justices who joined his opinion deemed correct.
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ment of the endorsement test in favor of a coercion one.73 Of greater
importance to the test's prospects for survival, there was speculation at
the time of Justice Alito's nomination that he was apt to repudiate the
legacy in this area of his predecessor-the primary author of the
endorsement test 4 and long75a strong proponent-and cast a decisive
fifth vote to jettison the test.
B.

The Nonabandonmentin Galloway
In the more than eight years between Justice Alito's appointment to
the Court in January 2006 and the Court's decision in Town of Greece
v. Galloway in May 2014, the Court did not revisit the question of
whether endorsement is sufficient to prove an Establishment Clause
violation or whether coercion must be shown instead. Throughout that
time, the impact that Justice Alito's replacing Justice O'Connor would
have on the Court's retention of the endorsement test therefore remained
to be seen. As noted earlier, however, a few weeks after Galloway,
Justice Scalia maintained in a dissenting opinion that the Court in
Galloway had finally
set the record straight by abandoning the
76
endorsement test.

Justice Scalia has long made no secret of his fervent desire for the
Court to abandon the test. 77 Ultimately, it appears that he has allowed
his eagerness for the Court to abandon the test to skew his perception
of whether the Galloway Court actually did so. By all indications, it did
not.
Galloway presented the question of whether the upstate New York
town of Greece was violating the Establishment Clause by its practice
since 1999 of opening its monthly town board meetings with an
invocation delivered by a rotating group of guest local clergy. To select

73. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Roberts's FilesRecall 80's Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16,
2005, at Al; David E. Rosenbaum, An Advocate for the Right, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2005,
at Al. Although Roberts was ultimately nominated for Chief Justice, he initially had been
nominated for Justice O'Connor's seat when she announced in July 2005 her desire to step
down. Thus, although Chief Justice Rehnquist did not retire prior to his death in office in
early September, the cited articles and many others about Roberts as a nominee appeared
over the summer before the Chief Justice's death.
74. See supra note 14.
75. See, e.g., David Kirkpatrick, Nominee Is Said to Question Church-State Rulings,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2005, at A22; Neil A. Lewis, Alito Often Ruled for Religious Expression,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2005, at A18.
76. Elmbrook Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 134 S. Ct. 2283, 2284 (2014) (Scalia, J., joined by
Thomas, J., dissenting), discussed supra text accompanying notes 29-40.
77. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640-44 (1992) (Scalia, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
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the guest clergy, a town employee relied on a town directory of local
congregations, with the result that, in this town of almost exclusively
Christian congregations, the prayer-givers at the monthly board
meetings from 1999 through 2007 were all Christian clergy. Moreover,
the invocations that they delivered commonly included specific appeals
or references to Christ.
In response to two citizens' complaints that the prayer practice was
being administered in a way biased toward Christians and Christianity,
the town diversified its monthly prayer-givers in 2008. That year, the
invocation was delivered four times by non-Christians-twice by a Jewish
layman and once by a Wiccan priestess, both of whom sought out the
opportunity, and once by a Bahai congregation's chairman, whom the
town invited. However, the prior pattern of only Christian prayer-givers
returned in 2009, and the two citizens who previously had complained
ultimately opted to challenge the prayer practice in federal court as
overstepping the limits of the Establishment Clause.
On a motion for summary judgment, the federal district court upheld
the prayer practice and dismissed.78 The court held that, for purposes
of determining constitutionality, the practice under review could not
fairly be distinguished from the legislative prayer practice upheld by the
Supreme Court in 1983 in Marsh v. Chambers.7 9 The federal court of
appeals, however, found Marsh distinguishable and reversed. According
to the appellate court, "viewed in its totality by an ordinary, reasonable
observer," the practice "must be viewed as an endorsement of a
particular religious viewpoint.8' The court of appeals based that
conclusion on three factors in particular: the town's utilization of a
process for selecting prayer-givers that "virtually ensured a Christian
viewpoint;" 8 ' the "steady drumbeat" over the years "of often specifically
sectarian Christian prayers;" 2 and actions by town officials and prayergivers that, "intentionally or not, contributed to the impression that
these prayer-givers spoke on the town's behalf.' The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and, by a 5-4 margin, reversed and ordered the suit
dismissed.
Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion that was joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito in full and by Justices Scalia and Thomas in
large part. In a portion of the opinion that all four joined (and that

78. Galloway v. Town of Greece, 732 F. Supp. 2d 195 (W.D.N.Y. 2010).
79. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
80. Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 29-30 (2d Cir. 2012).
81. Id. at 30.
82. Id. at 32.
83. Id.
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therefore has the status of an opinion of the Court), Justice Kennedy
began his analysis by offering his understanding of Marsh. In rejecting
the Establishment Clause attack on legislative prayer, the Court in
Marsh had emphasized the history of legislative prayer in the United
States-its origins in pre-constitutional practices, its adoption by the first
Congress virtually contemporaneous with that Congress's proposal of the
First Amendment for ratification by the states, its perpetuation in
Congress, and its longevity in the states. In addition, the Court in Marsh
had rejected the constitutional challenge without addressing whether
legislative prayer was consistent with the Lemon test or any of the
Court's other tests of compatibility with the Establishment Clause. In a
dissenting opinion in Marsh, Justice Brennan characterized Marsh as
"carving out" a special-history exception to those tests. 84 Writing in
Galloway, Justice Kennedy was emphatic that Marsh should not be
understood as any sort of exception to the Court's usual approach to
Establishment Clause challenges. He insisted that Marsh was entirely
consistent with the Court's usual tests in the area-simply an illustration
of the way in which those tests are sensibly applied to take into account
the history and tradition behind a particular practice.'
Justice Kennedy then turned to the respondents' argument that,
because the invocations were frequently sectarian, the town's prayer
practice fell outside the legislative prayer tradition approved in Marsh.
In rejecting their argument, Justice Kennedy maintained that, although
there is language in the Court's opinion in Allegheny County86 to
support the respondents' reading of Marsh, that language is not only
"dictum," but also "irreconcilable with the facts of Marsh and with its
holding and reasoning. " "T According to Justice Kennedy, "Marsh
nowhere suggested that the constitutionality of legislative prayer turns
on the neutrality of its content,"' and the "relevant constraint" on
legislative prayer "derives" not from any requirement of generic or
nonsectarian content but rather "from its place at the opening of
legislative sessions, where it is meant to lend gravity to the occasion and
reflect values long part of the Nation's heritage." 9 Absent a showing
that "over time" a particular legislative prayer practice has been used to
"denigrate nonbelievers or religious minorities, threaten damnation, or
preach conversion," the practice should be viewed as "ceremonial" prayer

84.
85.

Marsh, 463 U.S. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1818-19.

86.
87.
88.
89.

Allegheny Cnty. v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989).
Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1821.
Id.
Id. at 1823.
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of a sort that, notwithstanding any sectarian content, "adult citizens,
firm in their own beliefs, can tolerate and perhaps appreciate."9 °
Before moving on to the second of what he characterized as the
respondents' "two independent but mutually reinforcing reasons" for
finding an Establishment Clause violation, Justice Kennedy briefly
disposed of the court of appeals' "view" that the town "contravened the
Establishment Clause by inviting a predominantly Christian set of
ministers to lead the prayer."92 He rejected that view, maintaining
instead that there was no constitutional deficiency because the town's
selection process was "reasonable" and the highly sectarian results did
not "reflect an aversion or bias on the part of town leaders against
minority faiths."93
In a portion of the opinion not joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas,
Justice Kennedy then addressed the respondents' second, and distinct,
argument for unconstitutionality-an argument predicated on coercion.
According to the respondents, the Town of Greece's council meetings
have a potential for coercion to participate in religion that state
legislative sessions-the setting for the prayers in Marsh-do not. During
legislative sessions, ordinary citizens are confined to seats in the gallery
and to the role of onlookers. During the Town of Greece's council
meetings, however, it is not uncommon for some members of the
public-ones, for example, hoping to get a business permit or a license-to
come before the board to seek a favorable ruling from the board. Fearful
of displeasing the council members, a citizen who will be petitioning the
council for a permit or license later in the meeting may feel compelled
to participate visibly in the opening prayer.'
In rejecting the respondents' claim of unconstitutional coercion, Justice
Kennedy affirmed, as he did in Lee v. Weisman, that the government's
obligation not to coerce participation in religion is a bedrock Establishment Clause principle. 95 Also as in Lee, he made clear that the
coercion that must be shown in order to prove an Establishment Clause
violation need not rise to the level of legal compulsion-a concession that

90. Id.
91. Id. at 1820.
92. Id. at 1824.

As indicated supra text accompanying notes 80-83, the court of

appeals' view was more nuanced than Justice Kennedy described it. The court of appeals
characterized the selection process as one of three factors that, in combination, produced
an unconstitutional effect of government endorsement.
93. 134 S. Ct. at 1824.
94. Id. at 1824-25 (Kennedy, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Aito, J.).
95. As previously discussed, see supra note 60 and accompanying text, Justice Kennedy
in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992), described this principle as "fundamental" and
"beyond dispute." In Galloway, he called it "elemental." 134 S. Ct. at 1825.
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prompted Justices Scalia and Thomas to part ways here with Justice
Kennedy and write separately to insist, as they had in Lee, 96 that
nothing less than "actual legal coercion" would do.9 7 However, although
Justice Kennedy indicated a willingness to consider as proof of coercion
that "constituents might feel pressure to join the prayers to avoid
irritating the officials who would be ruling on their petitions," he refused
with "no evidentiary support" to find that such pressure existed in the
case at hand. 98 Instead, he likened the situation to that in Marsh,
where, he maintained, an adult audience would not reasonably feel
constrained to participate in (or even remain during) a prayer exercise,
and he contrasted it with the situation in Lee, where, he maintained, a
student audience reasonably would feel constrained to participate in
(and remain during) a prayer exercise.99
If the above account of Justice Kennedy's opinion in Galloway is
sound, Justice Scalia's claim that Galloway did away with the endorsement test is simply untenable. Most obviously, if Justice Kennedy
believed that the only question worth discussing was coercion, he would
not have bothered addressing the first of the respondents' two arguments. Unlike the second argument, the first does not attempt to claim
coercion. Instead, it is predicated on the assumption that government
action that sends a message of government endorsement of religion
violates the Establishment Clause.
Also highly indicative of Justice Kennedy's recognition, rather than
abandonment, of the endorsement test is the way in which he treated
the court of appeals' decision below. As Justice Kennedy expressly
acknowledged,"° that decision squarely and explicitly rested on a
determination that the town's prayer practice sent a message of
government endorsement of religion. If Justice Kennedy believed that
the appellate court had found the practice unconstitutional under a test
that a majority of the Supreme Court no longer deemed deserving of
application, he simply would have penned a brief opinion identifying the
appellate court's mistake, vacating its judgment, and remanding for
reconsideration in light of the properly applicable test-presumably, a
test of coercion. Instead, he proceeded to write a relatively lengthy
opinion in which he expressly took issue only with one aspect of the

96. Lee, 505 U.S. at 640-42 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and
Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
97. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1838 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
98. Id. at 1826 (Kennedy, J., joined by Roberts, C.J. and Alito, J.).
99. Id. at 1827.
100. Id. at 1818 (Kennedy, J., for the Court).
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appellate court's application of the endorsement test-specifically, the
court's determination that the nature of the town's prayer-giver selection
process militated in favor of holding the prayer practice unconstitutional.10'
Third and lastly, Galloway cannot be read as abandoning the
endorsement test without rendering much of Justice Kennedy's
discussion of Marsh nonsensical. As noted above, Justice Kennedy
argued at some length that, although Marsh did not explicitly apply any
of the Court's usual formal tests, it should be understood as consistent
with those tests and not as any sort of exception to them. In making
that argument, Justice Kennedy must have had the endorsement test,
rather than a coercion test, in mind. After all, his argument was a direct
response to Justice Brennan's charge in Marsh that the Court was
creating an exception to the usual tests, and the test that Justice
Brennan was saying is irreconcilable with the result in Marsh was a test
that invalidates endorsement, not coercion." 2 In addition, having
already identified in Lee the "obvious differences"0 3 in atmosphere and
audience between legislative prayer and graduation prayer that
distinguish the two practices in terms of possible coercive pressures, it
would be quite remarkable if Justice Kennedy felt the need in Galloway
to say anything to reconcile Marsh with a coercion test. It would not be
the least bit strange, however, if he felt the need to try to fend off an
argument that Marsh is incompatible with the endorsement test, and by
all indications, that is precisely what he was trying to do.
Whether or not the Court will retain the endorsement test for long is
difficult to predict. 'O However, if and when the Court revisits the

101. Id. at 1824.
102. Writing prior to the series of opinions by Justice O'Connor and others that fleshed
out the endorsement test and gave it its name, Justice Brennan did not specifically refer
to the "endorsement test." However, in applying the first two prongs of the Lemon test to
a practice that implicated what the Court in Lemon called the "evil" of "sponsorship" of

religion, Lemon v.Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971), Justice Brennan in effect replicated
application of what would become known as the "endorsement test." As he explained,
legislative prayer has a "pre-eminently religious" purpose and a primary effect of "link[ing]
religious belief and observance to the power and prestige of the State." Marsh, 463 U.S. at
797-98 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
103. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 597 (1992).
104. If the current Court were to address the issue, six votes seem quite clear: four
(Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor) for retaining the test, and two (Justices

Scalia and Thomas) for abandoning it. Although Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts
may be thought to be likely "no" votes, the likelihood is hardly certain. Some indication,
for example, that they may not vote "no" is that neither of them joined Justice Scalia's
dissenting opinion in Elmbrook School District v. Doe, 134 S.Ct. 2283, 2283-86 (2014)
(Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting), which declared the endorsement test both
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validity of the test, the longevity of the nonendorsement principle on the

'antiquated" and "abandoned." See supra text accompanying notes 29-40. They also both
refrained in Galloway from joining Justice Thomas's opinion, Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 183738 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment),
which touted the virtues of a coercion test. Justice Alito, however, did write separately in
Galloway "to respond to the principal dissent," id. at 1828 (Alito, J., joined by Scalia, J.,
concurring), and in that opinion, he made one statement that fairly can be understood as
expressing skepticism about the endorsement test. Referring to the endorsement test,
though not by name, Justice Alito observed that the appellate court in Galloway"appeared
to base its decision on one of the Establishment Clause 'tests' set out in the opinions of this
Court, but if there is any inconsistency between any of those tests and the historic practice
of legislative prayer, the inconsistency calls into question the validity of the test, not the
historic practice." Id. at 1834 (citation omitted).
Chief Justice Roberts, on the other hand, was content in Galloway simply to join Justice
Kennedy's opinion. Moreover, in light of the Chief Justice's apparent effort in general to
avoid sharp divisions among the Justices by encouraging narrow grounds for decision and
incremental, rather than dramatic, changes in the law, see Adam Liptak, Roberts's
IncrementalApproach FrustratesSupreme Court Allies, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2014, at A14;
Richard Wolf, From Politics to Prayer,A Supreme Court Game of Inches, USA TODAY, July
2, 2014, www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014107/02/supreme-court-term-conservativeincremental/11915611/, there may be good reason to believe that he would actively seek to
discourage abandonment of the endorsement test. After all, the test has been a major
component of the Court's Establishment Clause approach since the mid-1980s, and it
reflects and perpetuates an understanding of the Clause, as a prohibition on government
sponsorship of religion, widely shared among the Justices at least as far back as Schempp
in 1963.
Finally, despite Justice Kennedy's criticisms of the endorsement test at various times,
his readiness to abandon it is by no means a certainty. First, and most obviously, when
presented in Lee with a golden opportunity to secure a majority vote against the test, he
opted to sidestep the issue. The four dissenters in Lee made no secret of their desire to
jettison the test. Although Justice Kennedy disagreed with the dissenters on the result of
applying a coercion test to determine the constitutionality of the graduation prayer practice
under review, he easily could have written an opinion, if he wished, (a) agreeing in
principle with the four dissenters that coercion, not endorsement, is needed to prove an
Establishment Clause violation, but (b) concurring in the result reached by the four
Justices who would have been content simply to apply the endorsement test. Second, his
willingness in Santa Fe Independent School Districtv. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (discussed
supra note 68), to join an opinion of the Court that relied on principles of coercion and
endorsement to invalidate the high school football prayer practice under review suggests
a softening of his attitude toward the endorsement test in the decade after he strongly
criticized it in Allegheny County. Third and lastly, a decision on Justice Kennedy's part
not to disavow the test would be in keeping with the approach to stare decisis that he has
taken in a number of cases. As illustrated most vividly by a comparison of the plurality
opinion that he joined in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), and
the opinion in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), that he wrote jointly with
Justices O'Connor and Souter, he gives stare decisis sufficient weight in constitutional
interpretation that it may lead him in some instances to vote to retain a longstanding
precedent, like Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), that he might well decide differently if
it instead were a case coming before the Court for the first time.
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Court is deserving of special weight. As documented above in this
Section and Section A, more than fifty years ago, the Court with only
one Justice in dissent interpreted the Clause as including a nonendorsement principle, and it has stood by that interpretation as every seat on
the Court has changed hands one or more times.' °5 Perhaps most
impressive, and most indicative of the respect that the nonendorsement
principle has commanded on the Court, is that, of the three principles
that fairly can be characterized as foundational principles of the
approach to religious liberty that coalesced on the Court in the 1960s
and 1970s, the nonendorsement principle is the only one that remains.
The first to go was the Free Exercise Clause principle that an individual
who, because of his or her religion, is seriously burdened by a generally
applicable law in a way that others are not may seek a court-ordered
exemption from the application of the law. As noted earlier,' ° the
Court in 1990 in Employment Division v.Smith °7 repudiated that
principle, which dated back at least to Sherbert v. Verner in 1963.108
In 2002, the Court in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris"9 disposed of the
Establishment Clause principle that government through taxation
should not compel individuals to provide financial support to religion.
That principle, announced in Everson in 19471 ° and reaffirmed in
Lemon's account of the "three main evils" that prompted adoption of the
Clause,"' was interred in all but name when the Court in Zelman
approved an Ohio voucher
plan that funneled tax-raised money to
2
private religious schools."
C. The Case for the Nonendorsement Principle
Based on Other Considerations
In proceeding in Part I on the assumption that the Establishment
Clause is best understood as including a nonendorsement principle, I
relied in part on that principle's status, documented above in Sections
A and B, as an interpretation of the Clause adopted by the Supreme
Court with near unanimity more than fifty years ago and perpetuated
by the Court to this day. I also took that understanding as a given,
105.

See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONsTruTIoNAL LAW 1622-24

(18th ed. 2013) (table indicating Justices' lines of succession on the Court).
106.
107.
108.
109.

See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
536 U.S. 639 (2002).

110. Everson v. Bd.of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
111. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
112. See Gary J. Simson, School Vouchers and the Constitution-Permissible,
Impermissible, or Required?, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 553, 566-75 (2002).
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however, because I am persuaded that, even without regard to the
weight of Supreme Court precedent, the Clause is most soundly
interpreted to ban government endorsement of religion even if such
government support for religion does not rise to the level of coercion. In
light of the applicable page constraints for contributions to this
Symposium, I will not attempt here to address fully the various
arguments made in judicial opinions and in the law reviews for a
contrary interpretation of the Clause. I will do my best, though, to
outline what I regard as the key ingredients of the case for interpreting
the Clause as constitutionalizing a principle of nonendorsement.
I begin with the text of the Establishment Clause. For present
purposes, the key word of the Establishment Clause is "respecting." The
Court in Lemon explained the meaning of "respecting" in a way that the
Court is yet to disavow and that I find both very cogent in and of itself
and very relevant to the issue at hand:
[The Clause's] authors did not simply prohibit the establishment of a
state church or a state religion.... Instead they commanded that
there should be "no law respecting an establishment of religion." A law
may be one "respecting" the forbidden objective while falling short of
its total realization. A law "respecting" the proscribed result, that is,
the establishment of religion, is not always easily identifiable as one
violative of the Clause. A given law might not establisha state religion
but nevertheless be one "respecting" that end in the sense of being a
step that could lead to such establishment and hence offend the First
Amendment."3
In short, although the framers of the Clause regarded the establishment
of a state religion as the ultimate evil that they wished to prevent, they
recognized the need to intervene well before the point at which the
government is sufficiently emboldened to believe that the time is ripe to
put a state religion in place. By prohibiting laws respecting an establishment of religion, rather than simply prohibiting laws establishing a
religion, the framers demonstrated an intent to provide a means of
stopping the government before it got far along the road to the ultimate
evil of a state establishment-a point at which judicial intervention might
well be too little and too late.
The reason that the framers' decision to use "respecting" in the Clause
lends support to interpreting the Clause as authority for a nonendorsement principle is probably best understood against the backdrop of
arguments that Justices Scalia and Thomas have made for a coercion

113.

Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
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test. According to the two Justices, "actual legal coercion'n 4 "coercion
of religious orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law and threat
of penaltynS-is needed to show an Establishment Clause violation, not
mere endorsement nor even the level of pressure that the majority in the
graduation prayer case was willing to call coercion despite Justice
Scalia's protests that it was nothing more than "ersatz, 'peer-pressure'
psycho-coercion." 6 In the two Justices' view, the key to this understanding of the Clause is that it was precisely good old-fashioned, rocksolid legal coercion that was "a hallmark of historical establishments of
religion. " "'
The problem with their explanation, however, is that the framers did
not, as the explanation seems to assume, prohibit laws establishing a
state religion; rather, recognizing the importance of stopping government
action less restrictive of religious liberty than the characteristic
restrictions imposed by state establishments, they prohibited laws
respecting an establishment. The two Justices' interpretation of the
Clause as barring only coercive government action essentially reads the
word "respecting" out of the Clause. By contrast, a reading of the Clause
as barring endorsement not only gives meaning to "respecting"; it gives
the term a very fitting meaning. If, as the Court in Lemon explained,
a law "respecting" an establishment should be understood as a law that
is "a step that could lead to" an establishment, government endorsement
of religion is a prime candidate. Though not as constraining as the
"actual legal coercion" that was the "hallmark" of established religions,
government endorsement of religion contains the seeds of such coercion.
As the Court recognized by an 8-1 margin in Engel v. Vtale"8and
reiterated the following year in its landmark school prayer decision, 19
government endorsement of religion has the effect of placing "indirect
coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing
officially approved religion." In the Court's view, government endorsement of religion violates the Clause without any need to prove legal
coercion, but such endorsement is hardly coercion-free.
Additional support for recognizing government endorsement of religion
as sufficient to prove a violation of the Clause lies in the Clause's

114. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1838 (2014) (Thomas, J., joined by
Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
115. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640 (1992) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
and White and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
116. Id. at 641.
117. Id. at 640; see also Justice Thomas's opinion, joined by Justice Scalia, in Galloway,
134 S. Ct. at 1837 (quoting the above language from the Lee dissent).
118. 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
119. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 221 (1963) (quoting Engel).
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relation to the Free Exercise Clause-the clause in the First Amendment
with which the Establishment Clause is most closely textually paired.
"Congress shall make no law," the First Amendment provides, "respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.... " 12

Over the past fifty years, the Court has varied its

approach to the Free Exercise Clause quite dramatically in certain
respects.12 1 One constant, however, has been the understanding that
the essence of a free exercise claim is the need to show legal coercion."' Assuming that this understanding is correct, it is at a minimum highly problematic to interpret the Establishment Clause as all
about coercion as well. The fact that a proposed interpretation of one
clause in the Constitution-for example, the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV,'23 which expressly affords nonresidents of a state
protection against discrimination-has some overlap with a proposed
interpretation of another clause-for example, the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 24 which expressly provides a
broad guarantee against unfair discrimination-is not necessarily a
reason to doubt the soundness of either interpretation, particularly
when-as with the Privileges and Immunities and Equal Protection
Clauses-the clauses are located rather distant from one another in the
Constitution. However, to interpret two clauses of the Constitution as
doing virtually the same thing-no more and no less-seems highly
dubious, particularly when those two clauses are located next to one
another as part of the same sentence. Yet, that is precisely the effect of
insisting, as Justices Scalia and Thomas do, that a violation of the
Establishment Clause does not exist absent a showing of legal coercion.
When Supreme Court Justices and First Amendment scholars look to
the history of the adoption of the Establishment Clause to support one
or another interpretation of the Clause, they typically find little, if
anything, of significant assistance in the records of either the congressional debates that culminated in Congress's proposing the First Amendment to the states for ratification or the ratification debates within the
individual states. Instead, they almost invariably end up drawing on
more general history-history removed, often quite far removed, from the
amendment process itself: the religious establishments in Europe that
led some religious minorities to seek refuge in the New World, the

120. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
122. See, e.g., Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 219 (1972).
123. U.S. CONST. art. 1V, § 2, cl. 1.

124. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
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establishments that took root in the American colonies, and the
that persisted in individual
establishments or vestiges of establishment
125
states in the years after independence.
In short, the available history of the Establishment Clause is such
that, as to any particular issue, there typically is considerable room for
reasonable disagreement over what the historical record actually shows
and what lessons should be drawn from it. Under the circumstances, it
is no small thing that there is very broad agreement that government
sponsorship of religion was a prominent feature of the establishments of
of
Europe and the colonies and of the establishments and vestiges
12 6
establishment present in the early years of the United States.
The fact, though, that government sponsorship of religion was a
regular feature of the establishments that prompted the adoption of the
Establishment Clause does not settle that the Congress that proposed
the First Amendment and the states that ratified it must have been
significantly motivated to adopt the Clause by a desire to avoid
recurrence of that particular feature of establishments. In particular, if,
as critics of the Court's invalidation of laws based on sponsorship of
religion have argued, government sponsorship of religion does not cause
substantial harm to anyone or anything, 2 ' it is difficult to argue that
Congress and the states adopted the Clause in large part to do away
with such sponsorship.
The notion, however, that government sponsorship of religion does not
do any harm of substantial magnitude is dubious at best. In general,
coercion of religion may well be more harmful than sponsorship, but that
by no means implies that the harm from sponsorship is constitutionally
inconsequential. Government sponsorship of religion commonly causes
various types of harm. For present purposes, it should suffice to
Even assuming, for purposes of argument, that
highlight three.'

125. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE (1986).

126. According to a leading Religion Clauses scholar who takes an approach to
sponsorship akin to the Court's, "The only universal element of every establishment was
government endorsement of one or more religions." Douglas Laycock, "Noncoercive"
Support for Religion: Another False Claim About the Establishment Clause, 26 VAL. U. L.
REV. 37, 42 (1991). Though critical of judicial invalidation of laws based on sponsorship,

rather than coercion, of religion, another leading scholar has conceded that history supports
such invalidations. CHOPER, supra note 26, at 157-58 & n.203.
127. See, e.g., CHOPER, supra note 26, at 29-31.
128. In Simson, supra note 48, at 462-68, I identify, in addition to the three types of
harm discussed below, three other types of harm that endorsements commonly cause:
another type of harm to nonadherents; harm to government; and long-term harm to
posterity.
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reasonable people may differ as to whether each of the three types of
harm, viewed in isolation, qualifies as substantial, I suggest that, taken
together, the three types cannot fairly be understood as constituting less
than substantial harm.
First and most obviously, government sponsorship of religion typically
has an alienating and demeaning effect on nonadherents of the
sponsored religion. This is especially so for nonadherents for whom their
religion or nonadherence to any religion is an important part of their
lives and who they are. As Justice O'Connor memorably put it,
sponsorship "sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders,
not full members of the political community."129 Some critics of the
Court's attention to sponsorship have downplayed such harm and
suggested that anyone who feels seriously alienated or disrespected by
the sponsorship is simply being hypersensitive. 130 The crux of the
problem, though, seems not to be hypersensitivity on the part of
nonadherents, but rather insensitivity on the part of those untroubled
by the message.
It may well be that in speaking or acting in a way that endorses a
particular religion, legislators or other government actors do not
consciously intend to alienate nonadherents from their government or
convey to them any sort of message of disrespect. Nonetheless, good
intentions-or, more accurately, not bad ones-only count for so much.
Nonadherents who take to heart their religion or nonadherence to any
religion have good reason to feel alienated from their government and
disrespected by it when that government communicates a preference for
a religion to which they do not adhere. As a practical matter, by sending
to the public a message endorsing religion A, the government is telling
nonadherents of A not only that it values religion A and those who
subscribe to it but also that it has a lower opinion of other religions, of
nonadherence to any religion, and of individuals who subscribe to the
unsponsored belief systems.
Second, government sponsorship of religion may cause nonadherents
of the sponsored religion to suffer yet another type of emotional and
psychological harm. As the Supreme Court observed in Engel v. Vitale,
when government sponsors religion, "the indirect coercive pressure upon
religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved
religion is plain.""' Particularly when the religious minorities experi-

129. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
130. See, e.g., CHOPER, supra note 26, at 29-32; Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions,
and DoctrinalIllusions:EstablishmentNeutralityand the "NoEndorsement"Test, 86 MICH.
L. REV. 266, 307 (1987).
131. 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962). Engel is discussed supra note 46.
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encing that pressure to conform are children, and particularly when the
sponsorship does not occur in isolation but rather in combination or close
sequence with other acts of the same ilk, government sponsorship of
religion may well cause nonadherents to feel considerable mental

anguish.
Consider, for example, a 9-year-old Jewish girl who lives in a town
that, like the United States as a whole, has a population that is
predominantly Christian and about 2% Jewish 132 and who attends a
public elementary school that has a student body whose religious
composition mirrors that of the town. In walking to and from school
each day, the girl passes the town hall and, from late November to early
January, she sees on the town hall lawn a holiday display consisting
entirely of a life-size Nativity scene-the scene that, according to
Christianity, one would have seen at the birth of Christ. During those
same weeks, the classroom in which the girl spends almost the entire
school day has a colorfully decorated Christmas tree in the corner, with
several angels among the ornaments and a cross at the top. In late
November and early December, the school administration posts signs in
the hallways, and makes daily announcements over the intercom,
encouraging the students to try out for the annual school musical. The
musical is always performed at the school on the Friday and Saturday
evenings preceding Christmas and is always on one or another Christmas theme of a distinctly Christian nature. Students have no obligation
to attend the musical, but they and their families are all welcome to
attend without charge, and the auditorium is invariably filled to capacity

both nights.
None of the above forms of government sponsorship of Christianity,
singly or in combination, even arguably places on the young Jewish girl
the intense pressure to conform that Justices Scalia and Thomas regard
as the hallmark of an Establishment Clause violation. Nor do they
appear to place on her the somewhat lesser degree of pressure to
conform required to constitute an Establishment Clause violation under
Justice Kennedy's version of a coercion test. The cumulative pressure
to conform placed on the girl by the government endorsements, however,

132. According to a December 2012 Gallup poll, 77.3% of the adult population in the
United States identify themselves as Christian, and 1.7% identify themselves as Jewish.
17.8% do not identify with any religion. Frank Newport, In U.S., 77% Identify as
Christian, GALLUP (Dec. 24, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poU/159548/identify-chris
tian.aspx. A survey done several years earlier yielded similar results. PEw FORUM ON
RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUs LANDSCAPE SURVEY 10 (2008), available at

http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religious-landscape-study-full.pdf (finding 78.4%
Christian, 1.7% Jewish, and 16.9% with no religious affiliation).
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is more than sufficient to cause her to suffer substantial mental anguish.
Why can't she be more like the other children, she asks herself, and
enjoy the various benefits of belonging to the religious majority that the
town and public school confer on her classmates? Why must she be
denied those benefits simply because her parents wish to raise her
according to their minority religious precepts? But how can she, at 9
years old, hope to persuade her parents to let her religiously be one of
the crowd?
Third and lastly, government sponsorship of religion may have
harmful effects on the favored religion and its adherents. In his
influential Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,
Madison famously observed that "experience witnesseth that ecclesiastical establishments, instead of maintaining the purity and efficacy of
Religion, have had a contrary operation."133 One need not go back,
though, to the days of ecclesiastical establishments to find vivid
illustrations of what the Court, picking up on Madison's theme, has
described as the tendency of "a union of government and religion" to
"degrade religion."1" Consider, for example, the first eight words of
the invocation that a rabbi offered at the middle-school graduation under
review in Lee v. Weisman."n They illustrate all too well the potential
for degrading religion and offending the devout when public schools,
lawmaking bodies, and other government institutions seek to lend
solemnity and seriousness to an occasion by including a prayer that
broadly invokes divine guidance in a manner thought to be as inoffensive
as possible to all present.
In what presumably was intended as a moving variation of sorts on
the final words of the "Star-Spangled Banner"-"the land of the free and
the home of the brave"'3 6-the rabbi who delivered the invocation began
it with, "God of the Free, Hope of the Brave."137 Perhaps one really had
to be there to appreciate the value of the rabbi's opening words, but I
doubt it. On the one hand, if, as the rest of the rabbi's invocation
suggests, he indeed was eager to phrase his prayer in a manner
sufficiently bland and generic not to offend anyone in the audience, he
failed badly in that respect. Although his opening words were surely

133. The Memorial and Remonstrance is readily available in Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1, 63-72 (1947), where it is reprinted in full as an appendix to Justice
Rutledge's dissenting opinion.
134. Engel, 370 U.S. at 431.
135. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
136. Francis Scott Key, "The Star Spangled Banner" (1814), www.usa-flag-site.org/songlyrics/star-spangled-banner.shtml.
137. Lee, 505 U.S. at 581.
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less sectarian than they might have been, they still must have been
offensive to some in the audience who did not subscribe to any religion
as well as some who subscribed to a religion that does not include a
belief in God. On the other hand, and probably the furthest thing from
the rabbi's mind, his not-very-clever (or, to put it less charitably,
downright silly) riff on the "Star-Spangled Banner" demeaned religion
and promised
to offend those who take a belief in God very much to
13
heart.

8

III. REMEDYING A DOCTRINAL ANOMALY
If, as I have argued in Part II, government endorsement of religion
is properly understood to be one of the principal evils that the Establishment Clause was intended to address, it readily follows that, as
essentially a purpose of promoting a fundamental Establishment Clause
evil, a legislative purpose of endorsing religion is unconstitutional under
the Clause. In addition, to readers not steeped in the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause case law, it may just as readily follow from the
latter proposition that, to act consistently with the Clause, legislators
must entirely avoid relying on religious reasons when they decide
whether or not to adopt particular legislation.

138. When it comes to degrading the sponsored religion and offending its devout
followers, it is also hard to beat the Christmas display that Pawtucket, R.I. annually
erected in its downtown and that the Supreme Court by a 5-4 vote in Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668 (1984), upheld against an Establishment Clause attack. At the heart of the
Pawtucket challenge was the fact that a prominent part of the display was a Nativity
scene. As a re-creation of the birth of Christ, that part of the display appeared to have
undeniable and deep religious significance. With no intimation that the Justices found
anything in the display at all jarring or ironic-not to mention, sacrilegious-the majority
opinion matter-of-factly described the Nativity scene as located amidst such "figures and
decorations traditionally associated with Christmas" as "reindeer pulling Santa's sleigh,"
"candy-striped poles," and "cutout figures representing such characters as a clown, an
elephant, and a teddy bear." Id. at 671.
For a thorough critique of the Lynch Court's purported application of the Lemon test in
upholding the Pawtucket display, see William Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme
Court-Mr.Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J.
770. For discussion of the Court's surprising reinvigoration of the Lemon test in the Court's
very next Term, see Simson, supra note 11, at 907-08. In addition, note both the Court's
very different assessment of a stand-alone Nativity scene several years later in Allegheny
County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), discussed supra note 53, and the explanation offered
in Allegheny County by Justice O'Connor, well-established by that point as the champion
of the endorsement test, to reconcile her vote against the Nativity scene in Allegheny
County with her vote in Lynch for upholding the inclusion of the Nativity scene in the
Christmas display. Id. at 623-27 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
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Readers well-versed in that case law, however, may be given pause by
one of its longtime aspects-specifically, the doctrine that a challenge
under the Clause based on a law's purpose is successful only if the
challenger can prove that the law was based virtually entirely on a
purpose unconstitutional under the Clause. That doctrine is reflected in
the first prong of the Lemon three-prong test, under which an attack on
purpose will fail as long as the lawmaker can make the relatively modest
showing that at least some nonreligious purpose lay behind adoption of
the law.'3 9 Moreover, because the first prong of Lemon simply reiterated the first prong of the two-part test that the Court had announced in
the landmark school prayer decision,14 ° the doctrine in question goes
back a half-century. Is that doctrine fairly understood as a statement by
the Supreme Court that, although a purpose of sponsoring religion (or
promoting one of the other evils that the Clause was designed to
eliminate) is unconstitutional under the Clause, it is not all that bad for
lawmakers to rely on such purposes as long as they don't go overboard
and rely on unconstitutional purposes to the exclusion of anything else?
If so, then the assumption to the contrary underlying my proposed
approach in Part I to citizens' reliance on religious arguments is wrong,
and with that foundational assumption exposed as untenable, both it
and my proposed approach come tumbling down as a result.
There is indeed an anomaly, but it lies in the Court's doctrine, not in
the assumption that I have made. The Court's doctrine is based in part
on a very sound recognition-a recognition that purposes, not just results,
matter. In essence, by treating purpose as an independent ground for
invalidation under the Establishment Clause, the Court is saying that
the Constitution does not only protect against laws that, considered in
their final form, are inconsistent with the Clause; it also protects against
laws that are the end result of a process that was inconsistent with the
Clause. Interestingly, in the same year-1971-that the Justices were
reaffirming in Lemon that unconstitutional purpose is a solid ground for
attacking the constitutionality of a law under the Establishment Clause,
they were insisting in Palmer v. Thompson'" in an equal protection
context that challenges to constitutionality predicated on claims of
unconstitutional purpose posed such an array of difficulties that courts
should reject such challenges out of hand.
Perhaps even more interestingly, however, the Justices later in that
decade not only caught up in the equal protection area with their

139. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602-04 (1988); Mueller v. Allen, 463
U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983).
140. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
141. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
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recognition in Establishment Clause cases that purpose inquiries are not
so hopeless after all; 42 they soon after surpassed it. In an opinion by
Justice Powell that drew on an excellent scholarly critique of the Court's
rejection in Palmer of purpose inquiries,"" the Court in Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp.' took the recognition of the
importance of such inquiries to its logical conclusion. In keeping with the
concern about process that provides the rationale for purpose inquiries
altogether,'4 5 the Court in Arlington Heights established that proof of
unconstitutional purpose demonstrates a constitutionally unfair process
unless the lawmaker can show what amounts to harmless error-i.e., that
it would have adopted the law even if it had not considered the
unconstitutional purpose.'" On the same day as it handed down
Arlington Heights, the high court applied in a free speech context the
approach to unconstitutional purpose that it had developed in the equal
protection context of Arlington Heights.'47 Ironically, however-and, I
submit, erroneously-the Court is yet to extend that logic to its Establishment Clause case law, the area of law in which the Court first made an
inquiry into purpose part of its formal approach. If and when the Court
extends its insight in Arlington Heights to the realm of Establishment
Clause doctrine and remedies the anomaly that I have identified, its
approach under the Clause to unconstitutional purpose will fully support
the assumption that I made in Part I that, to act consistently with the
Clause, lawmakers should entirely avoid acting for religious reasons.
Even in terms of existing doctrine, the Court offers more support for
my assumption than may be apparent. Under both the Lemon test and
the endorsement test, which is essentially a subset of the Lemon test's
first two prongs, the Court assigns a level of significance to an effect of
endorsing religion that largely compensates for the anomaly in the
Court's formal approach to unconstitutional purpose. Under both tests,
a law should be struck down if a reasonable observer is likely to view it
as sending a message that the government either prefers a particular
religion or religious belief or prefers religion over nonreligion.'"
Because a reasonable observer's perception of the message communicated
by a law turns to a great extent on the purpose or purposes that he or

142.
143.

See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problemof Unconstitutional

Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. REv. 95.
144. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
145. See Brest, supra note 143, at 116-17.
146. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270-71 n.21.

147. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
148. See, e.g., Allegheny Cnty. v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592-94, 599-600 (1989).
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she believes prompted the lawmaker to adopt the law, the Court's
approach under the Clause to unconstitutional effect tacitly remedies to
a substantial degree the underinclusiveness of the Court's formal
approach under the Clause to unconstitutional purpose.14
Consciously or unconsciously, the Court may have crafted its approach
to unconstitutional effects of endorsing religion as it did partly out of a
recognition that unconstitutional purposes of endorsing religion are
substantially more problematic than the Court's formal approach to such
purposes suggests. However, whether or not the Court in crafting its
approach to unconstitutional effects of endorsing religion in any sense
"intended" to help remedy the underinclusiveness of its formal approach
to unconstitutional purposes of endorsing religion, the fact of the matter
is that the approach that it crafted did have that salutary effect. As a
result, the assumption that I made in Part I that lawmakers should
understand the Establishment Clause as a mandate not to rely at all on
religious purposes is, as a practical matter, quite close to the lesson that
lawmakers should draw from the combination of the Court's purpose and
effects tests.
**

*

In closing, I would like to return to the subject with which I began-my
friend and colleague Jack Sammons. A couple of weeks after I presented
a preliminary version of this Article at the live Symposium in Jack's
honor, Jack sent me an e-mail from his now-primary residence in
Vermont. He warmly thanked me for participating in the Symposium,
as he had when I spoke. He then added with characteristic good humor
that I probably would not be surprised to learn that his thinking and
mine on the topic that I addressed diverge more than could easily be
discussed in an e-mail exchange. That of course meant, he further
explained, that he and I can look forward to some interesting lunch
conversations when he returns to Macon in the spring. As I responded

149. For more on the connection between the inquiries into purpose and effect and for
illustrations of the way in which the effect inquiry helps compensate for the underinclusiveness of the Court's purpose inquiry, see Gary J. Simson & Erika A. Sussman, Keeping the

Sex in Sex Education: The FirstAmendment's Religion Clauses and the Sex Education
Debate, 9 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 265, 265-70, 283-97 (2000) (analyzing the

constitutionality under the Establishment Clause of abstinence-only sex education
programs in public schools), and Gary J. Simson, Religion by Any Other Name? Prohibitions
on Same-Sex Marriageand the Limits of the Establishment Clause, 23 COLUM. J. GENDER

& L. 132 (2012) (analyzing the constitutionality under the Establishment Clause of laws
prohibiting same-sex marriage).
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in an e-mail of my own, spring cannot come soon enough. Congratulations, again, Jack, and keep up the great work!

